Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.31337/oz.81.2.2
Must We Mean What We Point? Wittgenstein on Gestures
Kristijan Krkač
orcid.org/0000-0001-6956-8102
; Zagrebačka škola ekonomije i menadžmenta, Zagreb, Hrvatska
*
* Dopisni autor.
Sažetak
The text presents Wittgenstein’s later philosophy in four parts as a shift from pictorial
to gestural philosophy. The first and third parts are theoretical and they clarify
key differences, i.e. the first between text/speech and image, and the third between
text/speech and pointing/gesture. The second and fourth parts serve as examples of
theoretical presentations, i.e. the second part contains an example of a fly–catcher,
and the fourth part of Neapolitan gestures and pointing gestures. The explanation
of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy as at least partly pictorial is very rare in any event.
However, there are exaggerations that say that Wittgenstein took a pictorial turn inhis philosophy, but also other exaggerations that say that the pictorial parts in his
philosophy are not at all important. Here we go a step further in saying that, contrary
to the aforementioned exaggerations for which there is no evidence in the texts themselves,
Wittgenstein’s philosophy is nevertheless partly pictorial and that this pictorial
part is important for his method and examples (which are really philosophy itself).
An even further step suggests that there is a shift from pictures to moving pictures, i.e.
gestures (including human acts and forms of life). In this paper the author describes
and analyzes the saying/drawing distinction and illustrates this with Wittgenstein’s
example of a fly–catcher in order to demonstrate the idea of a picture as “an illustration
to a story”. Later in his philosophy he moves from pictures to gestures as
moving pictures which, if combined with words, are full–blooded actions that have
pictorial (bodily) and communicative (linguistic) aspects. This idea is illustrated by
Wittgenstein’s example of a pointing gesture, namely its use and structure. Pointing is
mainly connected to Wittgenstein’s ideas on ostensive definition and naming and the
author suggests that it should be equally connected to his ideas on action, practice
and forms of life.
Ključne riječi
fly–catcher; gestures; illustration to a story; naming; ostensive definition; pointing, saying/drawing distinction
Hrčak ID:
345892
URI
Datum izdavanja:
7.4.2026.
Posjeta: 290 *