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https://doi.org/10.18045/zbefri.2026.1.4

Deposit Insurance System under Different Financial Conditions

Stella Suljić Nikolaj ; University of Rijeka, Faculty of Economics and Business *

* Dopisni autor.


Puni tekst: engleski pdf 991 Kb

str. 247-278

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Sažetak

The deposit insurance system is a fundamental component of financial stability, as it protects depositors and mitigates the risk of bank runs. however, its impact on bank risk is not unambiguous and depends on the phase of the economic cycle. The aim of this paper is to examine the differential effects of deposit insurance systems on bank stability before, during and after a financial crisis. The analysis employs a dynamic panel model estimated with the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator on a sample of the European Union (EU) and selected Southeast European (SEE) countries in the period from 2005 to 2014. Bank stability was proxied by the z-score and the share of non-performing loans. The results show that the deposit insurance system has a stabilising effect during a crisis, as it mitigates the risk of banking system instability, while risk appetite increase in the periods before and after the crisis, suggesting the presence of moral hazard. In line with the research results and the lessons learned during the Global Financial Crisis, the EU continues to discuss the completion of the third pillar of the Banking Union, namely the common European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS). Although a consensus has not yet been reached among the Member States, due to differences in the characteristics of national financial systems, EDIS is seen as an instrument that could contribute to greater coordination and resilience of the banking sector in future crises.

Ključne riječi

bank stability; dynamic panel analysis; moral hazard; Banking Union

Hrčak ID:

348633

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/348633

Datum izdavanja:

30.6.2026.

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