Filozofska istraživanja, Vol. 28 No. 4, 2008.
Prethodno priopćenje
Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow
Iris Vidmar
; Sveučilište u Rijeci, Filozofski fakultet, Rijeka, Hrvatska
Sažetak
The feeling of the flow of time is undetachably connected to the way we experience time and think about it. There are, however, some theories that offer a different account of time, claiming that the feeling of its flow is nothing but our own subjective category that in no way corresponds to the real nature of time. Time neither flows nor passes, it just is, equally real in all of its wholeness at once. These theories, properly called eternalist theories, deny the special status that has traditionaly been attributed to the present as the only real slice of time and they instead claim that past and future are just as real. In this paper I confront these two stands and sum up the main footholds and issues of eternalism and it rival, presentist theories.
Ključne riječi
presentism; eternalism; A-theory; B-theory; tensed semantics; tenseless semantics; reductionism
Hrčak ID:
37069
URI
Datum izdavanja:
18.2.2009.
Posjeta: 2.503 *