Filozofska istraživanja, Vol. 26 No. 2, 2006.
Izvorni znanstveni članak
How Can One Catch a Thought-Bird? Some Wittgensteinian Comments to Computational Modelling of Mind
Andrej Ule
Sažetak
In this essay I analyse Wittgenstein’s criticism of several assumptions that are crucial for a large part of cognitive science. These involve the concepts of computational processes in the brain which cause mental states and processes, the algorithmic processing of information in the brain (neural system), the brain as a machine, psychophysical parallelism, the thinking machine, as well as the confusion of rule following with behaviour in accordance with the rule. In my opinion, the theorists of cognitive science have not yet seriously considered Wittgenstein’s criticism so they, quite surprisingly, frequently confuse the question “how does it work?” with “what does it do?” But their most “deleterious” mistake is their confusion of the internal computational (or parallel) processes taking place in the brain (which possibly cause mental states) with socially-based, everyday criteria of recognition and classification of, and knowledge about, the content of mental states.
Ključne riječi
Ludwig Wittgenstein; cognitive science; computational processes; modelling of mind; mental states
Hrčak ID:
5905
URI
Datum izdavanja:
7.7.2006.
Posjeta: 2.546 *