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Original scientific paper

Some Aspects of Epistemic Value and Role of Moral Intuitions in Ethics Education

Vojko Strahovnik orcid id orcid.org/0000-0003-2655-3642 ; Faculty of Theology, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia


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Abstract

Moral philosophy has for quite some time practiced the use of thought experiments in argumentative strategies. Thought experiments can be understood as imagined scenarios with a certain level of complexity and novelty, which are usually designed and used to elicit our responses or moral intuitions in order to make our use of key moral concepts clearer or in order to support or reject a particular ethical theory, general moral principle, hypothesis, deeply held moral belief or presupposition. Such imagined cases also often offer us a new insight, illumination and perspective on a given problem. One of the open questions is what is the epistemic status and value of such generated intuitions given their variability and instability. The paper combines a moderate defence of moral intuitions with a discussion of selected aspects of the use of cases in ethics education.

Keywords

moral intuition; reflection; thought experiments; imagined cases; ethics education

Hrčak ID:

135797

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/135797

Publication date:

25.2.2015.

Article data in other languages: croatian

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