Synthesis philosophica, Vol. 21 No. 1, 2006.
Original scientific paper
Shiffer’s Objections to DeRose’s Contextualism
Smiljana Gartner
Abstract
If the classical argument from skepticism is true, then we cannot claim that we know something and this also affects our ordinary claims about life, nature and us. DeRose proposes the New Contextualist Solution. Shiffer argues against DeRose’s explanation about the strength of the epistemic position. He also finds contextualist’s claim that in knowledge sentences without indexical terms the skeptical paradox arises, problematic. In this paper, I am trying to argue that we should look at examples in which the same object, different persons and different standards of knowing are involved. In that case it is hard to agree either with Shiffer’s or with DeRose’s solutions.
Keywords
knowledge; skepticism; attributors contextualism; epistemic standards; new contextualist solution; indexical and non-indexical terms
Hrčak ID:
5919
URI
Publication date:
3.7.2006.
Visits: 2.291 *