Original scientific paper

‘Knowledge is true belief’ rebutted

Scott F Aikin ; Nesto negdje

Abstract

Crispin Sartwell has argued that knowledge is merely true belief. The two arguments for this thesis are (1) from counter-examples to third requirements for knowledge and (2) from a dilemma for justification-theorists. I will show that the purported counter-examples are inconclusive because they do not reflect an informal pragmatic element of knowledge-attribution. The dilemma is inconclusive, because one horn is easily graspable. Further, I will refine Lycan’s argument that the thesis that knowledge is true belief is inconsistent with epistemic modesty.

Keywords

knowledge; justification; epistemic minimalism; Crispin Sartwell; William Lycan

Hrčak ID:

62639

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/62639

Publication date:

1.12.2010.

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