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‘Knowledge is true belief’ rebutted
Scott F Aikin
; Nesto negdje
Puni tekst: engleski pdf 172 Kb
str. 5-13
preuzimanja: 1.107
citiraj
APA 6th Edition
Aikin, S.F. (2010). ‘Knowledge is true belief’ rebutted. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 6 (2), 5-13. Preuzeto s https://hrcak.srce.hr/62639
MLA 8th Edition
Aikin, Scott F. "‘Knowledge is true belief’ rebutted." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol. 6, br. 2, 2010, str. 5-13. https://hrcak.srce.hr/62639. Citirano 05.10.2024.
Chicago 17th Edition
Aikin, Scott F. "‘Knowledge is true belief’ rebutted." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6, br. 2 (2010): 5-13. https://hrcak.srce.hr/62639
Harvard
Aikin, S.F. (2010). '‘Knowledge is true belief’ rebutted', European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 6(2), str. 5-13. Preuzeto s: https://hrcak.srce.hr/62639 (Datum pristupa: 05.10.2024.)
Vancouver
Aikin SF. ‘Knowledge is true belief’ rebutted. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy [Internet]. 2010 [pristupljeno 05.10.2024.];6(2):5-13. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/62639
IEEE
S.F. Aikin, "‘Knowledge is true belief’ rebutted", European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol.6, br. 2, str. 5-13, 2010. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/62639. [Citirano: 05.10.2024.]
Sažetak
Crispin Sartwell has argued that knowledge is merely true belief. The two arguments for this thesis are (1) from counter-examples to third requirements for knowledge and (2) from a dilemma for justification-theorists. I will show that the purported counter-examples are inconclusive because they do not reflect an informal pragmatic element of knowledge-attribution. The dilemma is inconclusive, because one horn is easily graspable. Further, I will refine Lycan’s argument that the thesis that knowledge is true belief is inconsistent with epistemic modesty.
Ključne riječi
knowledge; justification; epistemic minimalism; Crispin Sartwell; William Lycan
Hrčak ID:
62639
URI
https://hrcak.srce.hr/62639
Datum izdavanja:
1.12.2010.
Posjeta: 1.892
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