Original scientific paper
The Cognitional Problem in the Philosophy of Pavao Vuk Pavlović
Marija Brida
Abstract
Cognitional issues in Vuk-Pavlović's philosophy are essentially related to the ontological and axiological; this connection is characteristic for the very core of his philosophy. His attitudes on meaning, values and the scope of cognition, and the possibility and way of theoretically understanding cognition is deduced by him from an eidetically oriented analysis of experiential phenomena. He perceives experience (Erlebnis) as a real event in the current of being and retains its connection with reality in consideration. Husserl's influence is visible in Vuk-Pavlović's slant towards consideration of experiential structures, and in certain solutions for method and content, particularly Husserl's descriptive-analytical phase; but Vuk-Pavlović rejects Husserl's method postulate of transcendality, preferring a realistic line of phenomenological research. Meinong's theory of the objects also had a significant influence on him.
From the epistemological point of view, according to his premise, the theory of cognition is not a single science, rather it is more complex structurally: its central part consists of a part of metempirics, which implies a science of experiential totalities; the rest of the parts are associated with special sciences, such as the subjective function of psychology, and the intentional object of the theory of the object. In this way it is possible for empirical and exact research to contribute to insight into the meaning of cognition. An analogous hierarchy of meaningful connections emerges from the other humanist sciences as well.
Keywords
Hrčak ID:
84893
URI
Publication date:
7.12.1987.
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