Review article
Financial strength related fines and civil mechanisms of legal protection against cartels in the energy sector
Šime Jozipović
Marko Perkušić
Abstract
Cartel law is one of the key elements for the protection of market competition at EU level. Hefty fines which have significant financial consequences on included companies have proved to be effective means in the battle against cartels. However, the law on cartels at EU level has as its aim to deter cartels and sanction the participants. Therefore, in this way, it is not possible to rectify the damage done to all subjects who have fallen victim to cartel acitvity. The Court of the European Union has therefore in several judgements expressed the opinion that private individuals must have at their disposal the possibility of seeking damages. The recent suggestions by the Commission in this direction represent a revolution in private law in Europe. Therefore introducing expensive lawsuits and amending the burden of proof for the first time should equally in the EU provide the possibility of seeking damages from cartels
This paper critically presents novelties which should result from the implementation of the suggestions by the Commission. It also thematises the mutual activity of financial sanctions expressed by the Commission and novelties in the area of private law. Furthermore, particular emphasis lies in the influence of possible amendments in the area of private law on the economic power of cartel members. Continual procedure of expressing financial sanction is regarded in this way as is the connection with the company’sbalance related to the unpredictable system of damages in private law. In this context, the financial interests of cartel members is in particular examined and that, after introducing these amendments in the legal system, they participate in the procedure before the Commission as crown witnesses.
Keywords
Cartels; fines; expensive lawsuits; financial effect; accounting balance
Hrčak ID:
145567
URI
Publication date:
17.9.2015.
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