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Original scientific paper

https://doi.org/10.21464/sp34210

World as Phenomenon. Commentary on Husserl, Heidegger and Rombach

Niels Weidtmann ; Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Forum Scientiarum, Doblerstraße 33, DE–72074 Tübingen


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Abstract

To write a paper about the world as being a phenomenon implicates the assumption that the world is a phenomenon in the sense of philosophical phenomenology. That, however, is not uncontested even within phenomenology itself. In a Husserlian understanding, the world cannot be or become a phenomenon because any phenomenon refers to a relational context, i.e. to a horizon. While any horizon may become a phenomenon, because it refers to yet another horizon, the world cannot. World is the outmost horizon and, thus, it cannot refer to anything else. Therefore, it is not at all self-evident to claim that the world may be taken as a phenomenon. However, in my paper, I will go even beyond this claim and argue that world is, in fact, the phenomenon par excellence. In a sense, the world is the only phenomenon at all, because it not only gives its special meaning to everything that appears in the world, it itself appears differently, according to this special meaning. I will try to demonstrate this by referring particularly to the phenomenological approaches of Heidegger and Rombach. In the course of doing so, I hope to provide at least a few aspects of a phenomenological analysis of “world”.

Keywords

world; meaning; phenomenology; Edmund Husserl; Martin Heidegger; Heinrich Rombach; Maurice Merleau-Ponty

Hrčak ID:

232373

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/232373

Publication date:

20.12.2019.

Article data in other languages: french german croatian

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