Filozofska istraživanja, Vol. 40 No. 2, 2020.
Review article
https://doi.org/10.21464/fi40204
Comprehensiveness and Reasonableness of the Conceptions of the Good in the Dispute of Political Liberalism and Perfectionism
Michal Sládeček
; Univerzitet u Beogradu, Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, Kraljice Natalije 45, RS–11000 Beograd
Abstract
The paper argues that Rawls’ critique of perfectionism from the standpoint of neutral liberalism scrutinizes the conceptions of the good without demarcation between them, that is, without distinguishing whether they are comprehensive religious or philosophical conceptions, or whether they are piecemeal comprehensions of local values, concepts and goods. In addition to the high contestability in the use of the concept of comprehensiveness, it is necessary to retain the concept of reasonableness, as comprehensions of the good have to be to some extent well-founded, consistent and coherent to be considered relevant in a political dispute. Considering these distinctions, it can be claimed that, in particular cases, the application of considerations of the good in disputes concerning constitutional essentials can be supported and, considering reasonable pluralism, morally justified. Nevertheless, moderate perfectionism has to specify whether political decisions create and support options, promote valuable goods or they discourage worthless goods. It is necessary to delineate the limits of perfectionistic measures accordingly.
Keywords
neutrality; liberalism; perfectionism; reasonable conceptions of the good; doctrines; John Rawls
Hrčak ID:
245087
URI
Publication date:
17.8.2020.
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