Original scientific paper
https://doi.org/10.17535/crorr.2021.0014
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma among mobile agents performing 2D random walk
Jurica Hižak
orcid.org/0000-0002-8394-5581
; University North, University Center Varaždin, Croatia
Abstract
When Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma takes place on a two-dimensional plane among mobile agents, the course of the game slightly differs from that one in a well-mixed population. In this paper we present a detailed derivation of the expected number of encounters required for Tit-for-tat strategy to get even with Always-Defect strategy in a Brownian-like population. It will be shown that in such an environment Tit-for-Tat can perform better than in a well-mixed population.
Keywords
game theory; payoff; prisoner's dilemma; random walk; tit-for-tat
Hrčak ID:
267806
URI
Publication date:
23.12.2021.
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