Review article
https://doi.org/10.31192/np.20.2.14
A Theological Consideration of the Fundamental Option and Moral Epistemology Could We Regard Ourselves as Good People if Moral Knowledge is Impossible?
Bruno Matos
; Pontifical Gregorian University, Philosophical and Theological Institute of Society of Jesus, Zagreb, Croatia
Abstract
The paper analyses the justification of personal integrity in ethical theories in contemporary moral epistemology. In the first chapter we present a theological consideration of the fundamental option that illustrates the complexity of agency of moral knowledge in the epistemic evaluation of a moral act as a specifically human conduct. Then, in the second chapter we briefly describe the inference and the structure of moral knowledge in ethical theories. In the last chapter, we argue why our personal integrity, our own understanding of it in self-estimation is related to the possibility of moral knowledge. We claim that moral knowledge is crucial in development of moral integrity of a person. The speculations on the possibility of their inference and cognitive capacity reflect on the epistemic disposition of the human being as a moral agent. Although ethical theories have offered a scientifically and methodologically precise frame to justify the truthfulness of moral knowledge and judgments, they have not anticipated the important fact of integrity between the intention, free will and practical reason.
Keywords
Ethical pluralism; fundamental option; moral knowledge; perfect good; personal integrity
Hrčak ID:
280531
URI
Publication date:
15.7.2022.
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