Original scientific paper
ASYMETRIC INFORMATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM THE CROATIAN STATE-ADMINISTERED SUPPLEMENTAL PLAN
Tomislav Vukina
Danijel Nestić
Full text: croatian pdf 110 Kb
page 24-47
downloads: 779
cite
APA 6th Edition
Vukina, T. & Nestić, D. (2008). ASYMETRIC INFORMATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM THE CROATIAN STATE-ADMINISTERED SUPPLEMENTAL PLAN. Privredna kretanja i ekonomska politika, 18 (115), 24-47. Retrieved from https://hrcak.srce.hr/25947
MLA 8th Edition
Vukina, Tomislav and Danijel Nestić. "ASYMETRIC INFORMATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM THE CROATIAN STATE-ADMINISTERED SUPPLEMENTAL PLAN." Privredna kretanja i ekonomska politika, vol. 18, no. 115, 2008, pp. 24-47. https://hrcak.srce.hr/25947. Accessed 27 Dec. 2024.
Chicago 17th Edition
Vukina, Tomislav and Danijel Nestić. "ASYMETRIC INFORMATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM THE CROATIAN STATE-ADMINISTERED SUPPLEMENTAL PLAN." Privredna kretanja i ekonomska politika 18, no. 115 (2008): 24-47. https://hrcak.srce.hr/25947
Harvard
Vukina, T., and Nestić, D. (2008). 'ASYMETRIC INFORMATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM THE CROATIAN STATE-ADMINISTERED SUPPLEMENTAL PLAN', Privredna kretanja i ekonomska politika, 18(115), pp. 24-47. Available at: https://hrcak.srce.hr/25947 (Accessed 27 December 2024)
Vancouver
Vukina T, Nestić D. ASYMETRIC INFORMATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM THE CROATIAN STATE-ADMINISTERED SUPPLEMENTAL PLAN. Privredna kretanja i ekonomska politika [Internet]. 2008 [cited 2024 December 27];18(115):24-47. Available from: https://hrcak.srce.hr/25947
IEEE
T. Vukina and D. Nestić, "ASYMETRIC INFORMATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM THE CROATIAN STATE-ADMINISTERED SUPPLEMENTAL PLAN", Privredna kretanja i ekonomska politika, vol.18, no. 115, pp. 24-47, 2008. [Online]. Available: https://hrcak.srce.hr/25947. [Accessed: 27 December 2024]
Full text: english pdf 427 Kb
page 24-47
downloads: 1.397
cite
APA 6th Edition
Vukina, T. & Nestić, D. (2008). ASYMETRIC INFORMATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM THE CROATIAN STATE-ADMINISTERED SUPPLEMENTAL PLAN. Privredna kretanja i ekonomska politika, 18 (115), 24-47. Retrieved from https://hrcak.srce.hr/25947
MLA 8th Edition
Vukina, Tomislav and Danijel Nestić. "ASYMETRIC INFORMATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM THE CROATIAN STATE-ADMINISTERED SUPPLEMENTAL PLAN." Privredna kretanja i ekonomska politika, vol. 18, no. 115, 2008, pp. 24-47. https://hrcak.srce.hr/25947. Accessed 27 Dec. 2024.
Chicago 17th Edition
Vukina, Tomislav and Danijel Nestić. "ASYMETRIC INFORMATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM THE CROATIAN STATE-ADMINISTERED SUPPLEMENTAL PLAN." Privredna kretanja i ekonomska politika 18, no. 115 (2008): 24-47. https://hrcak.srce.hr/25947
Harvard
Vukina, T., and Nestić, D. (2008). 'ASYMETRIC INFORMATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM THE CROATIAN STATE-ADMINISTERED SUPPLEMENTAL PLAN', Privredna kretanja i ekonomska politika, 18(115), pp. 24-47. Available at: https://hrcak.srce.hr/25947 (Accessed 27 December 2024)
Vancouver
Vukina T, Nestić D. ASYMETRIC INFORMATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM THE CROATIAN STATE-ADMINISTERED SUPPLEMENTAL PLAN. Privredna kretanja i ekonomska politika [Internet]. 2008 [cited 2024 December 27];18(115):24-47. Available from: https://hrcak.srce.hr/25947
IEEE
T. Vukina and D. Nestić, "ASYMETRIC INFORMATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM THE CROATIAN STATE-ADMINISTERED SUPPLEMENTAL PLAN", Privredna kretanja i ekonomska politika, vol.18, no. 115, pp. 24-47, 2008. [Online]. Available: https://hrcak.srce.hr/25947. [Accessed: 27 December 2024]
Abstract
In this paper, we conduct simple micro-level econometric tests for the presence of the moral hazard and adverse selection manifestations in the Croatian supplemental health insurance program. Despite the fact that the obtained results are rather preliminary, they seem to be indicating the statistically significant presence of both adverse selection and moral hazard types of problems with various degrees of difficulty that they actually cause to the functioning of the Croatian health insurance system. The obtained results are then used to outline several policy recommendations in the realm of health insurance reform.
Keywords
health insurance; adverse selection; moral hazard
Hrčak ID:
25947
URI
https://hrcak.srce.hr/25947
Publication date:
30.7.2008.
Article data in other languages:
croatian
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