Review article
https://doi.org/10.46917/st.15.1.4
Constitutionalization of the European Union between Democratic Deficit and the Principle of Subsidiarity
Hrvoje Špehar
; Fakultet političkih znanosti, Sveučilište u Zagrebu, Zagreb, Hrvatska
Miroslav Juranek
Abstract
The article tries to explore a brief historical genealogy of the political
system of the European Union in terms of analyzing the development of
the quasi-confederation system and interstate cooperation, which after
the failed constitutionalization and the current state of the founding
treaties, largely depends on key actors at the intergovernmental level.
Since the asymmetric and specific political system of the European
Union is made up of numerous state and non-state actors, and that
during the historical institutionalization it is dominated by dynamics
that are the result of multiple compromises, the article seeks to show
how and to what extent this system has consolidated and what strength it
has not only in terms of the development of its own political institutions
but also in international relations. In particular, it is emphasized that the
result of the development of the European Union from the post-Lisbon
period, although marked by numerous economic, migrant, health and
security crises, is largely the result of a long tradition of the political
principle of subsidiarity, abandonment of federalization and the desire
to create a compromise acephalous and polycephalic political system.
Keywords
European Union; constitutionalism; democratic deficit; political theory of European integration; subsidiarity
Hrčak ID:
324785
URI
Publication date:
21.12.2024.
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