Original scientific paper
Reality Check: On the Solvability of the Realism/Constructivism Dispute in Ontology
Joško Žanić
; Zagreb, Croatia
Full text: english pdf 445 Kb
page 93-106
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cite
APA 6th Edition
Žanić, J. (2008). Reality Check: On the Solvability of the Realism/Constructivism Dispute in Ontology. Synthesis philosophica, 23 (1), 93-106. Retrieved from https://hrcak.srce.hr/30805
MLA 8th Edition
Žanić, Joško. "Reality Check: On the Solvability of the Realism/Constructivism Dispute in Ontology." Synthesis philosophica, vol. 23, no. 1, 2008, pp. 93-106. https://hrcak.srce.hr/30805. Accessed 21 Nov. 2024.
Chicago 17th Edition
Žanić, Joško. "Reality Check: On the Solvability of the Realism/Constructivism Dispute in Ontology." Synthesis philosophica 23, no. 1 (2008): 93-106. https://hrcak.srce.hr/30805
Harvard
Žanić, J. (2008). 'Reality Check: On the Solvability of the Realism/Constructivism Dispute in Ontology', Synthesis philosophica, 23(1), pp. 93-106. Available at: https://hrcak.srce.hr/30805 (Accessed 21 November 2024)
Vancouver
Žanić J. Reality Check: On the Solvability of the Realism/Constructivism Dispute in Ontology. Synthesis philosophica [Internet]. 2008 [cited 2024 November 21];23(1):93-106. Available from: https://hrcak.srce.hr/30805
IEEE
J. Žanić, "Reality Check: On the Solvability of the Realism/Constructivism Dispute in Ontology", Synthesis philosophica, vol.23, no. 1, pp. 93-106, 2008. [Online]. Available: https://hrcak.srce.hr/30805. [Accessed: 21 November 2024]
Abstract
In the introduction the paper presents, based on the work of Michael Devitt, the conflicting ontological positions of Realism and Constructivism. The former insists on the independence of the nature of the world from our conceptual apparatus, language or scientific theories, whereas the latter affirms its dependence. The central part of the paper is concerned with showing that the Realism/Constructivism dispute is unsolvable by way of a thought experiment followed by refutation of the arguments of key constructivists (Kant, Goodman) and realists (Devitt, Boghossian). The views of Hilary Putnam are also briefly assessed and rejected. In conclusion it is argued, partly with recourse to Carnap’s arguments, that the dispute cannot be resolved, that it is a kind of Kantian antinomy, and that being a realist or a constructivist is therefore a matter of decision. In the course of the article a view is also expressed with regard to the nature of philosophy.
Keywords
Realism; Constructivism; Worldmaking; reality; solvability; ontology; semantics; Michael Devitt
Hrčak ID:
30805
URI
https://hrcak.srce.hr/30805
Publication date:
23.7.2008.
Article data in other languages:
croatian
french
german
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