Original scientific paper

Internalism about Reasons: Two Interpretations

Matej Sušnik ; University of Rijeka, Faculty of Philosophy, Rijeka, Croatia

Abstract

Internalists about reasons argue that the presence of a motive is a precondition for the existence of a reason. According to the Humean interpretation of this view, reasons for action are always relative since their existence depends on the arbitrary elements which form one’s subjective motivational set. One of the greatest challenges to Humean internalism is the Kantian interpretation of the internalist position. The main intention of Kantian approach is to prove the possibility of rational motivation and thus deny Humean internalism. In this article I critically examine this discussion and attempt to defend Humean internalism against one contemporary Kantian proposal.

Keywords

normative reasons; motivating reasons; rationality; internalism; externalism

Hrčak ID:

41413

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/41413

Publication date:

21.7.2009.

Article data in other languages: croatian

Visits: 2.082 *