Izvorni znanstveni članak
Are We Causally Redundant? Eliminativism and the no-Self View
Jiri Benovsky
; University of Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland
Sažetak
Some friends of eliminativism about ordinary material objects such as tables or statues think that we need to make exceptions. In this article, I am interested in Trenton Merricks’ claim that we need to make an exception for us, conscious beings, and that we are something over and above simples arranged in suitable ways, unlike tables or statues. I resist this need for making an exception, using the resources of four-dimensionalism.
Ključne riječi
Eliminitivism; material objects; Trenton Merricks; consciousness; causality
Hrčak ID:
194993
URI
Datum izdavanja:
11.4.2017.
Posjeta: 873 *