Revija za sociologiju, Vol. 34 No. 1-2, 2003.
Izvorni znanstveni članak
Popper, Hempel and Wason - On Psychological and Logical Asimmetry between Verificationism and Falsificationism
Boran Berčić
Sažetak
In this article author tries to examine critically the main points of Sir Karl Popper's falsificationist philosophy of science. The stress is on the Popper's attempt to establish the asymmetry between verificationism and falsificationism. Although Popper was himself one of those who believed that observations are theory-laden, there is essential difference between his understanding of the theory-ladeness on the one hand, and Hanson's and Kuhn's, on the other hand. For Popper observations are not laden by the same theory they are supposed to test. The difference in the understanding of the theory-ladeness enables Popper to make sense of the ideas of the progress in science and of the truthlikeness of the theory. It seems that famous Wason's selection task, in spite of some unclarities, does show that we are psychologically biased toward verification. Popper's tehnical points about content of a theory, severity of a test and explanatory force of a theory are clarified. Further, author argues that Popper falsificationism is a solution of famous Hempel's paradox of ravens. The asymmetry between verificationism and falsificationism is shown in this abstract problem. Also, author argues that Duhem's argument is not a good reason for abandoning Popper's falsificationism, although it does undermine it to a certain degree.
Ključne riječi
FALSIFICATIONISM; VERIFICATIONISM; THEORYLADENESS; TRUTHLIKENESS; WASON'S SELECTION TASK; EMPIRICAL CONTENT; SEVERITY OF A TEST; TESTABILITY; CORROBORATION; CONFIRMATION; DISCONFIRMATION; HEMPEL'S PARADOX OF CONFIRMATION; DUHEM'S ARGUMENT
Hrčak ID:
14483
URI
Datum izdavanja:
30.6.2003.
Posjeta: 3.066 *