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Prolegomena : Časopis za filozofiju, Vol. 14 No. 2, 2015.

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Utilitarianism and Moral Integrity: How Evolutionary Psychology Undermines Our Moral Intuitions

Ivan Cerovac   ORCID icon orcid.org/0000-0003-3416-5295 ; University of Trieste – Department of Philosophy, Piazzale Europa 1, 34127 Trieste, Italy

Puni tekst: engleski, pdf (91 KB) str. 193-205 preuzimanja: 1.372* citiraj
APA 6th Edition
Cerovac, I. (2015). Utilitarianism and Moral Integrity: How Evolutionary Psychology Undermines Our Moral Intuitions. Prolegomena, 14 (2), 193-205. Preuzeto s https://hrcak.srce.hr/150932
MLA 8th Edition
Cerovac, Ivan. "Utilitarianism and Moral Integrity: How Evolutionary Psychology Undermines Our Moral Intuitions." Prolegomena, vol. 14, br. 2, 2015, str. 193-205. https://hrcak.srce.hr/150932. Citirano 24.03.2019.
Chicago 17th Edition
Cerovac, Ivan. "Utilitarianism and Moral Integrity: How Evolutionary Psychology Undermines Our Moral Intuitions." Prolegomena 14, br. 2 (2015): 193-205. https://hrcak.srce.hr/150932
Harvard
Cerovac, I. (2015). 'Utilitarianism and Moral Integrity: How Evolutionary Psychology Undermines Our Moral Intuitions', Prolegomena, 14(2), str. 193-205. Preuzeto s: https://hrcak.srce.hr/150932 (Datum pristupa: 24.03.2019.)
Vancouver
Cerovac I. Utilitarianism and Moral Integrity: How Evolutionary Psychology Undermines Our Moral Intuitions. Prolegomena [Internet]. 2015 [pristupljeno 24.03.2019.];14(2):193-205. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/150932
IEEE
I. Cerovac, "Utilitarianism and Moral Integrity: How Evolutionary Psychology Undermines Our Moral Intuitions", Prolegomena, vol.14, br. 2, str. 193-205, 2015. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/150932. [Citirano: 24.03.2019.]

Sažetak
This paper discuses Bernard Williams’ argument according to which utilitarianism is a bad moral theory because, by requiring us to reject conscience and our moral emotions in favour of the “lesser of evils”, it violates our moral integrity, itself a deep moral ideal. I discuss the implications of this objection, as well as the answer offered by Peter Railton. He claims that utilitarianism should respect (and not violate or reject) our conscience and moral emotions because, by violating our integrity for the best consequences, we would become demotivated and unable to act in the long run, and would thus decrease overall utility. This paper questions whether Railton’s solution adequately answers Williams’ objection, and argues that a possible answer should be looked for in recent studies in evolutionary psychology and in the very origin of our moral emotions.

Ključne riječi
Consequentialism; evolutionary psychology; moral integrity; moral intuitions; utilitarianism

Hrčak ID: 150932

URI
https://hrcak.srce.hr/150932

Posjeta: 1.658 *