Synthesis philosophica, Vol. 22 No. 1, 2007.
Izvorni znanstveni članak
Hegel’s thesis of the identity regarding substance as subject and the dialectic dissolution of conceptual definitions
Wilhelm Lütterfelds
Sažetak
Hegel’s thesis of identity regarding substance as subject starts with a self-referential concept of identity, that is, coinciding with itself. It is different from all the traditional, non-reflexive concepts of identity alternation, as in the beginning with Leibniz, Hume or Frege (along with Wittgenstein), as well as with Quine. The foundation of all consideration and discussion about beingness is that substance is in its conception of self circular, self-referential and a priori identical with itself. Still, this conceptual coinciding-with-itself is also – dialectically – the incongruity of all its substantial qualities with oneself, it is their dissolution and existence. Here, the other, the negative, belongs to the inner conceptual definition of substance itself, and the true in experience and science becomes the process of sequencing of opposite, visible phenomena of consciousness.
Ključne riječi
Substance; subject; coinciding-with-itself; selfincongruity; negative; becoming; dialectic identity
Hrčak ID:
16502
URI
Datum izdavanja:
6.8.2007.
Posjeta: 6.861 *