Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2018.1456352
‘Guaranteed lowest prices: do they facilitate collusion?’: Revisited
Jeong-Yoo Kim
; Department of Economics, Kyung Hee University, Seoul, South Korea
Joon Yeop Kwon
; School of Business Administration, Kyungpook National University, Daegu, South Korea
Sažetak
We examine the effect of guaranteed lowest price clauses (G.L.P.).
First, we correct the proof of Logan and Lutter’s main result that it is
the unique equilibrium outcome for firms adopting G.L.P. to charge
collusive prices in a simultaneous pricing game, if one uses the
trembling-hand perfect equilibrium as the solution concept. Second,
we extend their argument to a sequential pricing game in which one
firm chooses its price before the other, given that both firms adopt
G.L.P. We show that collusive prices is the unique equilibrium outcome
in this game even without resorting to any stringent refinement like
the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium.
Ključne riječi
Guaranteed lowest prices; price matching; collusionfacilitating practices
Hrčak ID:
206081
URI
Datum izdavanja:
3.12.2018.
Posjeta: 785 *