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Janko Jeri


Puni tekst: slovenski pdf 2.780 Kb

str. 187-239

preuzimanja: 422

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Sažetak

The problem of our western border, and Trieste in particular, had already gained prime significance in International politics during the Second World War. At that time the western powers, especially the United States and Great Britain, considered the control of Trieste a position which to a large extent determined their influence in central Europe and the Balkans.
The creation of an International territory, modelled after Gdanjsk following the First World War, was therefore a compromise, and this was realized by the Peace Treaty with Italy signed in Paris on February 10, 1947. Such a division represented, for Yugoslavia, a sacrifice. However, because of the Cold War, and the antagonisms which were already smoldering between previous allies, it was impossible to achieve more than this.
It is of course necessary to mention that on September 15, 1947, the Peace Treaty went into effect. As was specified by Article 21 of this Treaty, Italy's sovreignty over the territory which has returned to Yugoslavia and the FTT (Free Territory of Trieste) ceased. In the area, Anglo-American military administration was continued in Zone A, as was Yugoslav military administration in Zone B, since no agreement could be reached with regard to the role of governor. There can consequently be no doubt whatsoever that Italian sovreignty over this region ceased. Even the three-party declaration of March 20, 1948, mentions the suggestion of the return (emphasis by J. J.) of the FTT to Italian sovreignty. The French original states: "…que le Territoire Libre de Trieste soint de nouveau place sous la souveraineté italienne."
There followed a period of multilateral and bilateral efforts for the resolution of the Trieste question. Again, it was significant to whom Trieste would belong and in what manner this would be realized. In addition, it became clearer than ever that first of all, a real solution lay in the division of the FTT between Yugoslavia and Italy. Yugoslavia was unable to accept Italy's suggestion that the FTT problem be resolved with the help of a plebiscite. This would mean that the Italian majority in Trieste would have out-voted the Slovene and Croatian areas immediately outside the city. Italy, on the other hand, could not accept the Yugoslav proposition for alternative governors, which would have meant that for a certain period of time the governor would be Yugoslav and the vice-governor Italian, and later the reverse.
Negotiations aimed at an agreement on Trieste in the period from February to July 1954, developed along two parallel fronts: first representatives from the United States and Great Britain negotiated in favor of Yugoslavia, and in the second phase they carried on talks with Italy. In the first phase two possible solutions emerged (although indeed there were more variations); first, division of the Trieste territory with slight border changes in Yugoslavia’s favor, with a guarantee by the t v o big powers that they would not countenance further pretensions by either of the interested parties. The second possibility (and this was the central question in the first phase of the talks) would have guaranteed Yugoslavia an exit to the sea at Trieste, that is in the immediate vicinity of the city. In that case Italy would receive, on the basis of ethnic composition, several islands included in Zone B at that time.
Yugoslav representatives sought an exit to the sea in the area of Škedenj and Žavlje. The Italian party was opposed to such a solution. They sharply opposed the fact that Yugoslavia obtained use of a part of the Trieste harbor, even though the use would be guaranteed by an International agreement.
Yugoslav diplomacy took the position favoring the final resolution of this problem. Parallel with this, it demanded with equal firmness that every territorial solution include clearly defined guarantees for the Slovene national minority in the territory which would belong to Italy.
The London Agreement of October 5, 1954 meant a sacrifice for Yugoslavia. It was a compromise, which gave to Italy Trieste and about 70 thousand autochthonous Slovenes who lived in the area. The London Agreement - if we limit ourselves to its major characteristics - meant that a new division was agreed to so that a new boundary was drawn between Yugoslavia and Italy in the territory of the previous FTT. Besides this, a reciprocally effective special statute gave a relatively solid guarantee of real national equality for the Slovene minority, Inasmuch as this statute would be consistently carried out in practice.

Ključne riječi

Hrčak ID:

216338

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/216338

Datum izdavanja:

15.4.1975.

Podaci na drugim jezicima: hrvatski slovenski

Posjeta: 949 *