APA 6th Edition Bonnemann, J. (2018). Pathic Perception or Sensing of One’s Own Body? An Alternative to New Phenomenology. Synthesis philosophica, 33 (2), 419-434. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp33207
MLA 8th Edition Bonnemann, Jens. "Pathic Perception or Sensing of One’s Own Body? An Alternative to New Phenomenology." Synthesis philosophica, vol. 33, no. 2, 2018, pp. 419-434. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp33207. Accessed 24 Jan. 2021.
Chicago 17th Edition Bonnemann, Jens. "Pathic Perception or Sensing of One’s Own Body? An Alternative to New Phenomenology." Synthesis philosophica 33, no. 2 (2018): 419-434. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp33207
Harvard Bonnemann, J. (2018). 'Pathic Perception or Sensing of One’s Own Body? An Alternative to New Phenomenology', Synthesis philosophica, 33(2), pp. 419-434. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp33207
Vancouver Bonnemann J. Pathic Perception or Sensing of One’s Own Body? An Alternative to New Phenomenology. Synthesis philosophica [Internet]. 2018 [cited 2021 January 24];33(2):419-434. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp33207
IEEE J. Bonnemann, "Pathic Perception or Sensing of One’s Own Body? An Alternative to New Phenomenology", Synthesis philosophica, vol.33, no. 2, pp. 419-434, 2018. [Online]. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp33207
APA 6th Edition Bonnemann, J. (2018). Perception pathique ou sentiment de notre propre corps ? Une alternative à la Nouvelle Phénoménologie. Synthesis philosophica, 33 (2), 419-434. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp33207
MLA 8th Edition Bonnemann, Jens. "Perception pathique ou sentiment de notre propre corps ? Une alternative à la Nouvelle Phénoménologie." Synthesis philosophica, vol. 33, no. 2, 2018, pp. 419-434. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp33207. Accessed 24 Jan. 2021.
Chicago 17th Edition Bonnemann, Jens. "Perception pathique ou sentiment de notre propre corps ? Une alternative à la Nouvelle Phénoménologie." Synthesis philosophica 33, no. 2 (2018): 419-434. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp33207
Harvard Bonnemann, J. (2018). 'Perception pathique ou sentiment de notre propre corps ? Une alternative à la Nouvelle Phénoménologie', Synthesis philosophica, 33(2), pp. 419-434. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp33207
Vancouver Bonnemann J. Perception pathique ou sentiment de notre propre corps ? Une alternative à la Nouvelle Phénoménologie. Synthesis philosophica [Internet]. 2018 [cited 2021 January 24];33(2):419-434. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp33207
IEEE J. Bonnemann, "Perception pathique ou sentiment de notre propre corps ? Une alternative à la Nouvelle Phénoménologie", Synthesis philosophica, vol.33, no. 2, pp. 419-434, 2018. [Online]. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp33207
APA 6th Edition Bonnemann, J. (2018). Pathische Wahrnehmung oder eigenleibliches Spüren? Eine Alternative zur Neuen Phänomenologie. Synthesis philosophica, 33 (2), 419-434. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp33207
MLA 8th Edition Bonnemann, Jens. "Pathische Wahrnehmung oder eigenleibliches Spüren? Eine Alternative zur Neuen Phänomenologie." Synthesis philosophica, vol. 33, no. 2, 2018, pp. 419-434. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp33207. Accessed 24 Jan. 2021.
Chicago 17th Edition Bonnemann, Jens. "Pathische Wahrnehmung oder eigenleibliches Spüren? Eine Alternative zur Neuen Phänomenologie." Synthesis philosophica 33, no. 2 (2018): 419-434. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp33207
Harvard Bonnemann, J. (2018). 'Pathische Wahrnehmung oder eigenleibliches Spüren? Eine Alternative zur Neuen Phänomenologie', Synthesis philosophica, 33(2), pp. 419-434. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp33207
Vancouver Bonnemann J. Pathische Wahrnehmung oder eigenleibliches Spüren? Eine Alternative zur Neuen Phänomenologie. Synthesis philosophica [Internet]. 2018 [cited 2021 January 24];33(2):419-434. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp33207
IEEE J. Bonnemann, "Pathische Wahrnehmung oder eigenleibliches Spüren? Eine Alternative zur Neuen Phänomenologie", Synthesis philosophica, vol.33, no. 2, pp. 419-434, 2018. [Online]. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp33207
Abstracts In both traditional and contemporary philosophical discussion perception is usually considered to be a sensory knowing. Thus, it is overlooked that to perceive something also means to suffer the effect of what is being perceived, which is being experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Contrary, New phenomenology attempts to value precisely this overlooked pathic dimension by placing subject’s affective struckness into the centre of attention. While most of the approaches dealing with the philosophy of perception ignore the fact that the experience of object can be pleasant or unpleasant, New phenomenology examines this eventful characteristic, however, it is primarily understood as merely sensing one’s own body. In other words, what is happening with body becomes severed from any relation towards the world, both in epistemically-oriented philosophy of perception and body-oriented New phenomenology. This study presents an opposing project in which pleasant or unpleasant perception is examined from the perspective of pre-reflexive relation towards the world. In such a way we can demonstrate to what degree the experience of the world is not just bodily but vice versa also, that is, to what degree the experience of the self and body is mediated by the relation to the world.