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https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2019.1669063

Combined monetary and fiscal policy: the Nash Equilibrium for the case of non-cooperative game

Joanna Stawska ; Institute of Finance, University of Lodz, Lodz, Poland
Maciej Malaczewski ; Department of Econometrics, University of Lodz, Lodz, Poland
Agata Szymańska ; Institute of Economics, University of Lodz, Lodz, Poland

Puni tekst: engleski, pdf (2 MB) str. 3554-3569 preuzimanja: 48* citiraj
APA 6th Edition
Stawska, J., Malaczewski, M. i Szymańska, A. (2019). Combined monetary and fiscal policy: the Nash Equilibrium for the case of non-cooperative game. Economic research - Ekonomska istraživanja, 32 (1), 3554-3569. https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2019.1669063
MLA 8th Edition
Stawska, Joanna, et al. "Combined monetary and fiscal policy: the Nash Equilibrium for the case of non-cooperative game." Economic research - Ekonomska istraživanja, vol. 32, br. 1, 2019, str. 3554-3569. https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2019.1669063. Citirano 28.03.2020.
Chicago 17th Edition
Stawska, Joanna, Maciej Malaczewski i Agata Szymańska. "Combined monetary and fiscal policy: the Nash Equilibrium for the case of non-cooperative game." Economic research - Ekonomska istraživanja 32, br. 1 (2019): 3554-3569. https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2019.1669063
Harvard
Stawska, J., Malaczewski, M., i Szymańska, A. (2019). 'Combined monetary and fiscal policy: the Nash Equilibrium for the case of non-cooperative game', Economic research - Ekonomska istraživanja, 32(1), str. 3554-3569. https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2019.1669063
Vancouver
Stawska J, Malaczewski M, Szymańska A. Combined monetary and fiscal policy: the Nash Equilibrium for the case of non-cooperative game. Economic research - Ekonomska istraživanja [Internet]. 2019 [pristupljeno 28.03.2020.];32(1):3554-3569. https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2019.1669063
IEEE
J. Stawska, M. Malaczewski i A. Szymańska, "Combined monetary and fiscal policy: the Nash Equilibrium for the case of non-cooperative game", Economic research - Ekonomska istraživanja, vol.32, br. 1, str. 3554-3569, 2019. [Online]. https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2019.1669063

Sažetak
The importance of the central bank and the government conduct- ing their policies has increased recently, with more attention being given to the effectiveness of policy mix. The non-cooperative models of the monetary and fiscal game are frequently employed to study interactions between both authorities. The models assume that the authorities take into account each other’s choices when making decisions. It is also important to remember when seeking equilibrium in the non-cooperative models that in the Nash Equilibrium (which is sought in this study) the parties try to come up with the best response to the opponent’s decision. The aim of the paper is to present the Nash Equilibrium in a non-cooperative game between the government and the central bank using a non-cooperative model of a fiscal-monetary game (a policy-mix MODEL). This study demonstrates that in the Nash Equilibrium in the model, the budget deficit and interest rate of an EU member state depend on the exogenous data (external to the model), such as inflation target, base inflation and the Maastricht deficit limit. This study is enhanced by an analysis of the government and central bank’s sensitivity to the deep parameters of economic variables.

Ključne riječi
Monetary policy; fiscal policy; game theory; Nash equilibrium; non-cooperative game

Hrčak ID: 229697

URI
https://hrcak.srce.hr/229697

Posjeta: 83 *