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ZIMMERMANN’S CRITICS OF JASPER’S DENYING THE METAPHYSICAL COGNITION
Ivica Musić
orcid.org/0000-0002-8434-3742
; Filozofski fakultet Sveučilišta u Mostaru
Sažetak
In this paper the author confronts Karl Jaspers and Stjepan Zimmermann’s
attitudes about the possibility, range and scope of metaphysics
as a rational activity. While Jaspers thinks that a mind is an inadequate
medium as far as transcendental reality is concerned, so the scope of metaphysics,
according to him, can’t be in conceiving objective truth about
the last base of essence, than possibly in the lightening up the spaces in
which we meet with entire essence – Zimmermann thinks that the rational
establishment of metaphysics is necessary and correct. For Zimmerman
metaphysics is possible in the first place because it is like natural
sciences based on empiric quality and ideal judgments. The method of
deductive inference and causality is for them a common “bridge” to the
non-phenomenal reality; only a natural scientist restricts himself to this
special area, and a metaphysician covers entire non-phenomenal reality
as a source of phenomenal world and life.
Ključne riječi
metaphysics; cognition; mind; world; phenomenon; causality principle.
Hrčak ID:
231871
URI
Datum izdavanja:
19.12.2006.
Posjeta: 608 *