Skoči na glavni sadržaj

Synthesis philosophica, Vol. 28 No. 1-2, 2013.

Izvorni znanstveni članak

Mathematics and Pragmatic Naturalism

Nenad Smokrović ; University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Rijeka, Croatia
Majda Trobok orcid id orcid.org/0000-0002-3473-3769 ; University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Rijeka, Croatia

Puni tekst: engleski pdf 353 Kb

str. 263-270

preuzimanja: 722

citiraj

Sažetak

In this paper we shall concentrate on the issue of those ways of knowing in mathematics that have traditionally been taken to support apriorism. We shall do it by critizing pragmatic naturalism in the philosophy of mathematics, and in particular its historical approach in denying any role to apriority in mathematical epistemology. The version of pragmatic naturalism we shall be analyzing is Kitcher’s. In the paper we shall first set out a brief survey of the relevant features of Kitcher’s pragmatic naturalism in the philosophy of mathematics and then indicate the points that provoke our disagreement.

Ključne riječi

pragmatic naturalism; philosophy of mathematics; Platonism; Philip Kitcher

Hrčak ID:

120146

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/120146

Datum izdavanja:

17.2.2014.

Podaci na drugim jezicima: hrvatski francuski njemački

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