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Ten Models of Consciousness That Are None

Sabine Windmann ; Johann Wolfgang Goethe University of Frankfurt, Institute of Psychology, Frankfurt/Main, Germany

Sažetak

Ten models of consciousness are discussed. The models are proposed by individuals who do not seem to understand “the hard problem of phenomenal consciousness”, presumably because they have no qualia themselves. As the Zombie’s proposals are dismissed, the quality of their comments and contributions rises. It is concluded that no premature solution to the hard problem should be proposed at this point; instead it is suggested that the problem must first be appreciated to full extent by scientists and students of all faculties dealing with information processing in the human brain. Ultimately, the question is why the brain, when in a particular state, experiences its own activity qualitatively. The answer to that question will probably expand the current ontology of physics.

Ključne riječi

phenomenal consciousness; qualia; zombie; neuroscience; physicalism; philosophy of mind

Hrčak ID:

23584

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/23584

Datum izdavanja:

15.2.2008.

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