Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.26362/20250206
Artworks or Aesthetic Objects? Applying Kendall Walton’s Normative Thesis to AICAN-generated Digital Objects
Ksenija Savčić
; University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Department of Philosophy
Sažetak
This paper examines the philosophical implications of AI-generated digital objects in artistic institutions, focusing on Ahmed Elgammal’s (2017) study, which assumes that aesthetic appeal, novelty, and indistinguishability from human-made artworks suffice to classify these objects as artworks. I challenge this tacit premise by arguing that AICAN-generated digital objects cannot be evaluated in the same way as human artworks because they lack extrinsic properties necessary for correct categorization. Drawing on Kendall Walton’s Categories of Art (1970), I assert that truth and falsity apply to aesthetic judgments of artworks. I examine and defend Walton’s requirements for the correct categorization of artworks against relevant objections. I proceed by applying Walton’s requirements to AICAN outputs. I argue that AICAN’s digital objects fail to meet two crucial requirements for correct categorization. Thus, their aesthetic properties necessarily remain category-relative, exposing artistic practice to radical relativism in aesthetic judgment. I contend that Walton’s distinction between aesthetic objects and artworks provides a plausible framework for understanding AICAN’s outputs and the aesthetic response they elicit. Accordingly, I argue that AICAN digital objects should be regarded as aesthetic objects rather than artworks.
Ključne riječi
aesthetic objects; aesthetic relativism; AI-generated art; AICAN; cat-egories of art; Walton
Hrčak ID:
340102
URI
Datum izdavanja:
27.11.2025.
Posjeta: 692 *