Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.52685/cjp.25.74.11
The Cost of Dying: Biological Naturalism and the Value of Life
Sun Demirli
; Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, Turkey
Sažetak
This paper explores the metaphysical and normative dimensions of death within a biological naturalist framework. It defends the view that persons are contingently identical with their animal bodies and argues that life has only instrumental value—deriving its significance from the experiences, relationships, and projects it enables. On this view, death is not harmful in itself but is a misfortune insofar as it deprives individuals of these goods and interrupts their capacity to engage in meaningful pursuits. The analysis draws on two complementary frameworks: Nagel’s deprivation account and the interruption thesis advanced by Furley and Nussbaum. To respond to key Epicurean objections—such as the symmetry argument and the temporality problem—the paper adopts a comparative and atemporal perspective on harm. It further refines the interruption thesis by distinguishing between egocentric and nonegocentric projects, clarifying why posthumous fulfillment of a person’s aims does not mitigate the harm of death. By integrating these perspectives, the paper offers a unified account of death’s badness: it is a dual harm involving both the loss of potential goods and the personal deprivation of actively shaping and completing one’s own life projects.
Ključne riječi
Persons; life; cost of death; deprivation argument; interruption argument.
Hrčak ID:
340286
URI
Datum izdavanja:
1.12.2025.
Posjeta: 199 *