Prethodno priopćenje
https://doi.org/10.31337/oz.81.1.2
Are Dream Experiences Truly Novel?: A Philosophical Inquiry into Thompson’s Thesis
Ayush Srivastava
orcid.org/0000-0002-2874-4218
; Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Bombay, India
*
* Dopisni autor.
Sažetak
In this paper, I will delve into Evan Thompson’s analysis of dream experiences,
which has challenged philosophers and scholars in the past. Many thinkers argue
that dreams are not conscious experiences; there is an opposite view in which
philosophers still argue for dreams as conscious phenomena. The paper primarily
focuses on the hypothesis: ‘Thompson’s explication of dreams as conscious
experiences.’ Philosophers like Norman Malcolm and Daniel Dennett critique
the eminent received view of dreaming, asserting that dream experiences lack
conscious awareness. However, recent philosophical contributions by Thompson
criticize their standpoint and posit that dreams are conscious experiences with
an independent status during sleep. The paper navigates this philosophical conflict,
and I have specifically taken a defence examining Thompson’s explication
of dream consciousness, emphasizing the metaphysical and ontological bases of
dreams. Lastly, I discuss the limitations of his analysis and also propose a tripartite
model of the dynamic nature of our dreaming mind.
Ključne riječi
access consciousness; conscious experiences; dreams; phenomenal consciousness; sleep; Evan Thompson
Hrčak ID:
340997
URI
Datum izdavanja:
7.1.2026.
Posjeta: 443 *