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Thinking about Phenomenal Concepts

Luca Malatesti orcid.org/0000-0001-9911-0637 ; University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Rijeka, Croatia

Sažetak

Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument and different conceivability arguments, advanced by Saul Kripke, David Chalmers and Joseph Levine, conclude that consciousness involves non-physical properties or properties that cannot be reductively accounted for in physical terms. Some physicalists have replied to these objections by means of different versions of the phenomenal concept strategy. David Chalmers has responded with the master argument, a reasoning that, if successful, would undermine any reasonable version of the phenomenal concept strategy. In this paper, I argue that the master argument does not advance the debate between the supporters of the anti-physicalist arguments and those of the phenomenal concept strategy.

Ključne riječi

consciousness; qualia; zombies; a posteriori physicalism; phenomenal concept strategy; David Chalmers’s master argument

Hrčak ID:

82561

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/82561

Datum izdavanja:

17.4.2012.

Podaci na drugim jezicima: hrvatski francuski njemački

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