Filozofska istraživanja, Vol. 31 No. 1, 2011.
Izvorni znanstveni članak
Rawls’ Theory of Justice and the Question of Truth
Nebojša Zelič
orcid.org/0000-0001-7765-5775
; Sveučilište u Rijeci, Filozofski fakultet, Rijeka, Hrvatska
Elvio Baccarini
orcid.org/0000-0002-6771-9859
; Sveučilište u Rijeci, Filozofski fakultet, Rijeka, Hrvatska
Sažetak
In this paper we discuss the relation between Rawls’ political liberalism and truth. Since political liberalism is a theory that avoids all controversial epistemological and metaphysical questions, it equally avoids the question of its truth and a concept of truth generally. We are focusing on three authors which claim that political liberalism can not avoid the question of truth. First, Joseph Raz, a perfectionist who claims that Rawls’ political theory is incoherent unless it is not concerned with the truth of some moral doctrine on which it must be derived. Second, David Estlund, who claims that Rawls’ theory is philosophically untenable unless it does not consider its fundamental principle as true one. Third, Joshua Cohen, indicates the impossibility of avoiding some concept of truth if political theory is invoking concepts such as beliefs and justification. We are pointing on theirs practical-political and philosophical limited range in criticizing Rawls’ theory. The basic intention of the article is to confute criticisms addressed to Rawls and, in this way, to strengthen his proposal of political liberalism. At the same time, we try to resolve issues deriving from indeterminacies in Rawls’ proposal. For this reason we offer a picture of political liberalism that is more determinate than his original proposal.
Ključne riječi
John Rawls; Joseph Raz; David Estlund; Joshua Cohen; political liberalism; truth
Hrčak ID:
72740
URI
Datum izdavanja:
25.7.2011.
Posjeta: 4.171 *