Filozofska istraživanja, Vol. 31 No. 2, 2011.
Izvorni znanstveni članak
Aristotle’s Treatment of Logos, “Will” and Responsibility of Animals
Željko Kaluđerović
orcid.org/0000-0002-6572-4160
; Univerzitet u Novom Sadu, Filozofski fakultet, Novi Sad, Srbija
Sažetak
This paper analyzes Aristotle’s treatment of animals and the author’s research focuses on three issues: the presence of logos in animals, if animals can act voluntarily and if animals are responsible for what they do. Aristotle’s general standing point is that animals do not have beliefs, opinions, calculations, thoughts, thinking and reason. By studying Stagirites’ volumes it has been determined, subsequently, that animals can act voluntarily. Resolution to the dilemma whether animals are responsible for what they do depends on the understanding of the Aristotle’s concept of responsibility. If responsibility is understood as regulating all of those activities which were undertaken on purpose i.e. voluntarily, animals can be considered responsible. On the other hand, if the scope of responsibility is limited to the moral evaluation of acts, including the activity of logos, animals will be excluded from thus understood concept of responsibility. The author has, following Aristotle’s footsteps, concluded that since animals can have phantasia that what they do is right or wrong, they should be either rewarded or punished for their acts.
Ključne riječi
Aristotle; treatment; animals; logos; “will”; responsibility; reward; punishment
Hrčak ID:
72761
URI
Datum izdavanja:
8.9.2011.
Posjeta: 2.491 *