Izvorni znanstveni članak

Phenomenological Objectivity and Moral Theory

Matjaž Potrč ; University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Arts, Ljubljana, Slovenia
Vojko Strahovnik orcid.org/0000-0003-2655-3642 ; University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Theology, Ljubljana, Slovenia

Sažetak

The relation between moral phenomenology and moral theory is dealt with. The aims in the paper involve the following: clarifying the notion of moral phenomenology, especially the impact that it has on moral theory; interpreting the discussion between moral cognitivism and non-cognitivism in the light of moral phenomenology; presenting the most recent position of cognitive expressivism concerning this debate; pointing out the main shortcomings of this theory, especially in respect to the purported objectivity of moral judgements. Cognitive expressivism still leaves a gap between the immediate features of our internal moral psychology and their theoretical explanation, thereby losing much of its apparent phenomenological support. A proper understanding of the purported phenomenological objectivity is proposed along with its consequences for moral theory.

Ključne riječi

moral phenomenology; moral theory; objectivity; cognitivism; non-cognitivism; cognitive expressivism; belief; truth; moral realism

Hrčak ID:

138258

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/138258

Datum izdavanja:

26.11.2014.

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Posjeta: 3.047 *