Filozofska istraživanja, Vol. 27 No. 4, 2007.
Izvorni znanstveni članak
Human Good in the Nicomachean Ethics I
Maja Hudoletnjak Grgić
Sažetak
In the Nicomachean Ethics, the theory of human happiness is set forth in two separate accounts, in Book I and in Book X. In Book X, Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of happiness, while the discussion in Book I strongly suggests that only one definition of happiness should be accepted. Yet, it appears that in Book X Aristotle identifies happiness with one activity, while in Book I it is assumed that it includes more than one activity. I try to show what is the conception of happiness offered in Book I, by analysing the arguments by which Aristotle advances to the definition of human good. I argue that the ergon argument, which leads to this definition, is not intended in the Nicomachean Ethics to stand as independent argument, for its conclusion is wider and dependent on the previous arguments by which the formal criteria for human good are established. The ergon argument can lead to the definition of human good in as much as it can reduce human good to one type of good, but its conclusion includes the completeness criterion introduced from previous argument. This conclusion cannot specify the kind of activity in which happiness consists, but formally it determines the conditions for which the final analysis will show that only one activity can satisfy them.
Ključne riječi
Aristotle; happiness; good; end; virtue; ergon
Hrčak ID:
19710
URI
Datum izdavanja:
28.1.2008.
Posjeta: 10.402 *