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https://doi.org/10.21464/fi38208

Utilitarianism: Moral Standard And/Or “Decision Procedure”?

Nenad Cekić ; Sveučilište u Beogradu, Filozofski fakultet, Čika-Ljubina 18-20, RS-11000 Beograd


Puni tekst: hrvatski pdf 404 Kb

str. 339-359

preuzimanja: 667

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Puni tekst: engleski pdf 404 Kb

str. 339-359

preuzimanja: 703

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Sažetak

The paper analyses a growing belief that utilitarianism as a theory of normative ethics offers a morality standard, but not a method (“procedure”) of making moral choices. According to the author's belief, this idea emerged as a possible response to some of the critiques of utilitarian-ism, based on the notion of “demandingness”. Firstly, I laid out the original argument proposed by Eugene Bales, about how the utilitarianism of procedure and indirect procedures based on rules can be “reconciled” by setting morality standard apart from the methods of making deci-sions. Next, Hurley's theory is outlined, according to which the separation of consequentialist (thus utilitarian) morality standard and decision procedures allows for the choice ofprocedure which does not request unreasonable demands from agents. The author analyses both ideas and lays out a possible meta-ethical and normative-ethical objections that can be constructed.

Ključne riječi

utilitarianism; consequentialism; demandingness objection; standard of rightness; decision procedure

Hrčak ID:

211800

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/211800

Datum izdavanja:

9.7.2018.

Podaci na drugim jezicima: hrvatski

Posjeta: 3.204 *