Filozofska istraživanja, Vol. 44 No. 2, 2024.
Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.21464/fi44201
Kant’s Critique of Pure Moral Interest
Franjo Mijatović
orcid.org/0000-0002-1854-7472
; Sveučilište u Rijeci, Medicinski fakultet, Braće Branchetta 20, HR–51000 Rijeka
Sažetak
In this paper, the author explores the foundational determinants of interests of reason and interests of inclination within the framework of the determining principle of action. Special attention is given to the concept of pure moral interest. The underlying assumption is the recognition that sensibility dictates what is pleasurable and promises sensory delight, while reason discerns what is morally good. Since every determination of the will arises through one of these two ways, it becomes clear that every act of the will is rooted in an interest. In this context, the paper addresses the challenges of elucidating pure moral interest in order to adequately express the obligation of the categorical imperative to respect the moral law. The conclusion emphasizes that the potential moral conflict between the interests of inclination and those of reason concerns only the individual who chooses the sensory incentive as a potential determinant of their actions, and does not pose a challenge to the moral law itself.
Ključne riječi
Immanuel Kant; pleasure; interest; inclination; reason; pure moral interest; will; categorical imperative
Hrčak ID:
327507
URI
Datum izdavanja:
7.11.2024.
Posjeta: 178 *