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Elimination of eliminativisms

Davor Pećnjak

Sažetak

In this article, the author examines two kinds of eliminativisms in the philosophy of mind – eliminative materialism and functional eliminativism. He shows that mature neuroscience has to explain phenomena which are denoted by the concepts »perception«, »mind« or »consciousness« and that these concepts are not introduced as explanations of something. Consciousness, for example, is a factual phenomenon that should be explained and cannot be eliminated, by eliminative materialism or by functional eliminativism, as an explanandum and as a fact.

Ključne riječi

Eliminative materialism; functional eliminativism; mind; consciousness; reductionism; folk psychology; mature neuroscience; mind-machine analogy

Hrčak ID:

319

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/319

Datum izdavanja:

10.6.2002.

Podaci na drugim jezicima: hrvatski

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