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Elimination of eliminativisms
Davor Pećnjak
Sažetak
In this article, the author examines two kinds of eliminativisms in the philosophy of mind – eliminative materialism and functional eliminativism. He shows that mature neuroscience has to explain phenomena which are denoted by the concepts »perception«, »mind« or »consciousness« and that these concepts are not introduced as explanations of something. Consciousness, for example, is a factual phenomenon that should be explained and cannot be eliminated, by eliminative materialism or by functional eliminativism, as an explanandum and as a fact.
Ključne riječi
Eliminative materialism; functional eliminativism; mind; consciousness; reductionism; folk psychology; mature neuroscience; mind-machine analogy
Hrčak ID:
319
URI
Datum izdavanja:
10.6.2002.
Posjeta: 2.334 *