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  • Publication date: 01.12.2009.
  • Published on HRČAK: 19.01.2011.

Table of contents

Full text

From tracking relations to propositional attitudes (page 7-18)

Adam Morton
Original scientific paper


Folk psychology is not a metarepresentational device (page 19-38)

Tamás Demeter
Original scientific paper


Not every feeling is intentional (page 39-52)

Katalin Farkas
Original scientific paper


The phenomenological argument for the disjunctive theory of perception (page 53-66)

János Tözsér
Original scientific paper


Understanding how experience "seems" (page 67-78)

Thomas Raileigh
Original scientific paper


Why phenomenal content is not intentional (page 79-93)

Howard Robinson
Original scientific paper


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