Original scientific paper

Rawls’ Theory of Justice and the Question of Truth

Nebojša Zelič orcid.org/0000-0001-7765-5775 ; University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Rijeka, Croatia
Elvio Baccarini orcid.org/0000-0002-6771-9859 ; University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Rijeka, Croatia

Abstract

In this paper we discuss the relation between Rawls’ political liberalism and truth. Since political liberalism is a theory that avoids all controversial epistemological and metaphysical questions, it equally avoids the question of its truth and a concept of truth generally. We are focusing on three authors which claim that political liberalism can not avoid the question of truth. First, Joseph Raz, a perfectionist who claims that Rawls’ political theory is incoherent unless it is not concerned with the truth of some moral doctrine on which it must be derived. Second, David Estlund, who claims that Rawls’ theory is philosophically untenable unless it does not consider its fundamental principle as true one. Third, Joshua Cohen, indicates the impossibility of avoiding some concept of truth if political theory is invoking concepts such as beliefs and justification. We are pointing on theirs practical-political and philosophical limited range in criticizing Rawls’ theory. The basic intention of the article is to confute criticisms addressed to Rawls and, in this way, to strengthen his proposal of political liberalism. At the same time, we try to resolve issues deriving from indeterminacies in Rawls’ proposal. For this reason we offer a picture of political liberalism that is more determinate than his original proposal.

Keywords

John Rawls; Joseph Raz; David Estlund; Joshua Cohen; political liberalism; truth

Hrčak ID:

72740

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/72740

Publication date:

25.7.2011.

Article data in other languages: croatian

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