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Synthesis philosophica, Vol. 28 No. 1-2, 2013.

Original scientific paper

Mathematics and Pragmatic Naturalism

Nenad Smokrović ; University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Rijeka, Croatia
Majda Trobok orcid id orcid.org/0000-0002-3473-3769 ; University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Rijeka, Croatia

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Abstract

In this paper we shall concentrate on the issue of those ways of knowing in mathematics that have traditionally been taken to support apriorism. We shall do it by critizing pragmatic naturalism in the philosophy of mathematics, and in particular its historical approach in denying any role to apriority in mathematical epistemology. The version of pragmatic naturalism we shall be analyzing is Kitcher’s. In the paper we shall first set out a brief survey of the relevant features of Kitcher’s pragmatic naturalism in the philosophy of mathematics and then indicate the points that provoke our disagreement.

Keywords

pragmatic naturalism; philosophy of mathematics; Platonism; Philip Kitcher

Hrčak ID:

120146

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/120146

Publication date:

17.2.2014.

Article data in other languages: croatian french german

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