Original scientific paper

The Limits of Functional Reduction

Janez Bregant

Abstract

It is obvious why the antireductionist picture of mental causation, which considers mental phenomena to be causally efficacious, is so attractive: it preserves the unique nature of the mental (mental realism), while at the same time it tries to secure a place for the mental in our world which is compatible with a physicalist ideology (physical monism). But Kim’s so called argument from supervenience reminds us of the dilemma that we face while favouring antireductionist solutions of mental causation which might force us to abandon them and look for some other more plausible ones. The trouble is, namely, the following: either mental properties have causal powers or not. If they have them then we violate the causal closure principle which means a denial of physicalism. If not, then we embrace epiphenomenalism, which denies the mental causal powers of any sort. So, either we give up physicalism or accept epiphenomenalism. Since antireductionism loses both ways neither of
these options represents a true alternative for its proponents. For this reason some authors think that we should look at reductionism in order to explain mental causation in a more satisfactory manner. However, it is not the traditional Nagel model of reduction that is in play here, but some rather more sophisticated ones. The first part of the article presents the reasons for dropping classical reduction, the second part describes Kim’s functional model of reduction as one of its possible successors, and the final part of the article discusses the reasons for its failure.

Keywords

reductionism; anti-reductionism; Nagel’s classical model of reduction; Kim’s functional model of reduction; Lewis-Armstrong causal theory; mental causation

Hrčak ID:

16522

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/16522

Publication date:

6.8.2007.

Article data in other languages: french german

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