Synthesis philosophica, Vol. 20 No. 2, 2005.
Original scientific paper
THE LIMITS OF REPRESENTATIONALISM: A Phenomenological Critique of Thomas Metzinger's Self-Model Theory
SONJA RINOFNER-KREIDL
Abstract
Thomas Metzinger’s self-model theory offers a frame¬work for naturali¬zing subjective expe¬rien¬ces, e.g. first-person perspective. These phenomena are ex¬plained by referring to repre¬sen¬tational contents which are said to be interrelated at diverse levels of consciousness and correlated with brain activi¬ties. The paper begins with a consideration on naturalism and anti-naturalism in order to roughly sketch the background of Metzinger’s claim that his theory renders philosophical spe¬culations on the mind unnecessary (I). In particular, Husserl’s phenomenological con¬ception of conscious¬ness is refuted as uncritical and inadequate. It will be demonstrated that this critique is misguided. (II). The main deficiencies of Metzinger’s theory will be elucidated by referring to the con¬ception of phenomenal trans¬parency (III) which will be compared to a phenome¬nological idea of transparency (IV). Then we shall en¬large our critical horizon by focusing on some impli¬cations of representationalism, including reifica¬tion of conscious¬ness, brain-Cartesianism, and ex¬clu¬sion of the social dimension (V). Finally, we shall take up our meta-theoretical reflec¬tions on the naturalism debate (VI).
Keywords
Hrčak ID:
2434
URI
Publication date:
20.12.2005.
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