Filozofska istraživanja, Vol. 39 No. 1, 2019.
Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.21464/fi39109
“How Does It Feel?” – On What Plays in Judgments of Taste and Emotional Self-Knowledge
Rômulo Eisinger Guimarães
orcid.org/0000-0003-1912-8242
; Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, Centro de Ciências Sociais e Humanas, Av. Roraima 1000, BR–97105–900 Santa Maria / Friedrich Schiller Universität, Institut für Philosophie, Twätzengasse 9, DE–07743 Jena
Sažetak
Despite the widely known Latin proverb, according to which about tastes it should not be discussed, concerning judgments of taste, we (at least most of us) do dispute. However, based on what? If someone disagrees with our judgment, judging differently than us, we seek arguments to try to convince them otherwise. But by which arguments? The paper dwells on the issues about what underlies the arguments we use to justify our judgments of taste and how reliable these arguments are. From eighteenth-century philosophy to contemporary philosophy of consciousness and mind, the aim here is to show that judgments of taste involve self-knowledge (especially, emotional self-knowledge) and that the question “how does it feel?”, at first glance simple, does not seem to be so easy to answer.
Ključne riječi
aesthetic experience; judgments of taste; beauty; emotional self-knowledge
Hrčak ID:
224014
URI
Datum izdavanja:
6.3.2019.
Posjeta: 2.290 *