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Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.15.2.4

How Do We Know That We Are Free?

Timothy O’Connor ; Indiana University

Puni tekst: engleski, pdf (411 KB) str. 79-98 preuzimanja: 284* citiraj
APA 6th Edition
O’Connor, T. (2019). How Do We Know That We Are Free?. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 15 (2), 79-98. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.15.2.4
MLA 8th Edition
O’Connor, Timothy. "How Do We Know That We Are Free?." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol. 15, br. 2, 2019, str. 79-98. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.15.2.4. Citirano 31.07.2021.
Chicago 17th Edition
O’Connor, Timothy. "How Do We Know That We Are Free?." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15, br. 2 (2019): 79-98. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.15.2.4
Harvard
O’Connor, T. (2019). 'How Do We Know That We Are Free?', European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 15(2), str. 79-98. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.15.2.4
Vancouver
O’Connor T. How Do We Know That We Are Free?. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy [Internet]. 2019 [pristupljeno 31.07.2021.];15(2):79-98. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.15.2.4
IEEE
T. O’Connor, "How Do We Know That We Are Free?", European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol.15, br. 2, str. 79-98, 2019. [Online]. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.15.2.4

Sažetak
We are naturally disposed to believe of ourselves and others that we are free: that what we do is often and to a considerable extent ‘up to us’ via the exercise of a power of choice to do or to refrain from doing one or more alternatives of which we are aware. In this article, I probe the source and epistemic justification of our ‘freedom belief’. I propose an account that (unlike most) does not lean heavily on our first-personal experience of choice and action, and instead regards freedom belief as a priori justified. I will then consider possible replies available to incompatibilists to the contention made by some compatibilists that the ‘privileged’ epistemic status of freedom belief (which my account endorses) supports a minimalist, and therefore compatibilist view of the nature of freedom itself.

Ključne riječi
Free will; freedom experience; incompatibilism; a priori justification; conscious awareness; revisionism

Hrčak ID: 229964

URI
https://hrcak.srce.hr/229964

Posjeta: 613 *