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https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.15.2.4

How Do We Know That We Are Free?

Timothy O’Connor ; Indiana University


Puni tekst: engleski pdf 411 Kb

str. 79-98

preuzimanja: 424

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Sažetak

We are naturally disposed to believe of ourselves and others that we are free: that what we do is often and to a considerable extent ‘up to us’ via the exercise of a power of choice to do or to refrain from doing one or more alternatives of which we are aware. In this article, I probe the source and epistemic justification of our ‘freedom belief’. I propose an account that (unlike most) does not lean heavily on our first-personal experience of choice and action, and instead regards freedom belief as a priori justified. I will then consider possible replies available to incompatibilists to the contention made by some compatibilists that the ‘privileged’ epistemic status of freedom belief (which my account endorses) supports a minimalist, and therefore compatibilist view of the nature of freedom itself.

Ključne riječi

Free will, freedom experience, incompatibilism, a priori justification, conscious awareness, revisionism

Hrčak ID:

229964

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/229964

Posjeta: 1.043 *