Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others
Thaddeus Metz
orcid.org/0000-0001-9861-2408
; University of Pretoria, Department of Philosophy 20–10, Humanities Building, Private Bag X20, Hatfield, ZA–0028 Pretoria
Puni tekst: engleski pdf 368 Kb
str. 65-81
preuzimanja: 403
citiraj
APA 6th Edition
Metz, T. (2021). A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others. Synthesis philosophica, 36 (1), 65-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
MLA 8th Edition
Metz, Thaddeus. "A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others." Synthesis philosophica, vol. 36, br. 1, 2021, str. 65-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105. Citirano 24.04.2024.
Chicago 17th Edition
Metz, Thaddeus. "A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others." Synthesis philosophica 36, br. 1 (2021): 65-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
Harvard
Metz, T. (2021). 'A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others', Synthesis philosophica, 36(1), str. 65-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
Vancouver
Metz T. A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others. Synthesis philosophica [Internet]. 2021 [pristupljeno 24.04.2024.];36(1):65-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
IEEE
T. Metz, "A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others", Synthesis philosophica, vol.36, br. 1, str. 65-81, 2021. [Online]. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
Puni tekst: hrvatski pdf 368 Kb
str. 80-80
preuzimanja: 209
citiraj
APA 6th Edition
Metz, T. (2021). A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others. Synthesis philosophica, 36 (1), 65-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
MLA 8th Edition
Metz, Thaddeus. "A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others." Synthesis philosophica, vol. 36, br. 1, 2021, str. 65-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105. Citirano 24.04.2024.
Chicago 17th Edition
Metz, Thaddeus. "A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others." Synthesis philosophica 36, br. 1 (2021): 65-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
Harvard
Metz, T. (2021). 'A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others', Synthesis philosophica, 36(1), str. 65-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
Vancouver
Metz T. A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others. Synthesis philosophica [Internet]. 2021 [pristupljeno 24.04.2024.];36(1):65-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
IEEE
T. Metz, "A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others", Synthesis philosophica, vol.36, br. 1, str. 65-81, 2021. [Online]. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
Puni tekst: njemački pdf 368 Kb
str. 81-81
preuzimanja: 152
citiraj
APA 6th Edition
Metz, T. (2021). A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others. Synthesis philosophica, 36 (1), 65-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
MLA 8th Edition
Metz, Thaddeus. "A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others." Synthesis philosophica, vol. 36, br. 1, 2021, str. 65-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105. Citirano 24.04.2024.
Chicago 17th Edition
Metz, Thaddeus. "A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others." Synthesis philosophica 36, br. 1 (2021): 65-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
Harvard
Metz, T. (2021). 'A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others', Synthesis philosophica, 36(1), str. 65-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
Vancouver
Metz T. A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others. Synthesis philosophica [Internet]. 2021 [pristupljeno 24.04.2024.];36(1):65-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
IEEE
T. Metz, "A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others", Synthesis philosophica, vol.36, br. 1, str. 65-81, 2021. [Online]. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
Puni tekst: francuski pdf 368 Kb
str. 81-81
preuzimanja: 135
citiraj
APA 6th Edition
Metz, T. (2021). A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others. Synthesis philosophica, 36 (1), 65-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
MLA 8th Edition
Metz, Thaddeus. "A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others." Synthesis philosophica, vol. 36, br. 1, 2021, str. 65-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105. Citirano 24.04.2024.
Chicago 17th Edition
Metz, Thaddeus. "A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others." Synthesis philosophica 36, br. 1 (2021): 65-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
Harvard
Metz, T. (2021). 'A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others', Synthesis philosophica, 36(1), str. 65-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
Vancouver
Metz T. A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others. Synthesis philosophica [Internet]. 2021 [pristupljeno 24.04.2024.];36(1):65-81. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
IEEE
T. Metz, "A Relational Theory of Mental Illness – Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others", Synthesis philosophica, vol.36, br. 1, str. 65-81, 2021. [Online]. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36105
Sažetak
In this paper, I aim to progress towards the philosophical goal of ascertaining what, if anything, all mental illnesses have in common, attempting to unify a large sub-set of those with a relational or interpersonal dimension. One major claim is that, if we want a promising theory of mental illness, we must go beyond the dominant western accounts of mental illness/health, which focus on traits intrinsic to a person such as pain/pleasure, lethargy/ liveliness, fragmentation/integration, and falsehood/authenticity. A second major claim is that the relational facets of mental illness are plausibly understood theoretically in terms of a person’s inability to identify with others or exhibit solidarity with them, relational values salient in the African philosophical tradition. I show that these two extrinsic properties explain several intuitive instances of mental illness well, including, amongst several others, being abusive, psychopathic, narcissistic, histrionic, paranoid, and phobic.
Ključne riječi
intrinsic; extrinsic; mental health; mental illness; neurosis; philosophy of psychology; relational disorders; relational values
Hrčak ID:
257909
URI
https://hrcak.srce.hr/257909
Datum izdavanja:
8.6.2021.
Podaci na drugim jezicima:
hrvatski
njemački
francuski
Posjeta: 2.265
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