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Autonomy and Duties regarding Non-Human Nature

Kostas Koukouzelis ; University of Crete, Philosophy and Social Studies Department, Rethymno Campus, Crete, Greece

Puni tekst: engleski pdf 380 Kb

str. 61-72

preuzimanja: 532



The paper makes an effort to present a view that answers objections put forward by many philosophers that Kant’s account of duties regarding non-human nature does not ground adequate moral concern for non-human natural entities. In doing so, I reject what I call the “psychological” interpretation of duties regarding non-human nature, and try to follow the “moral perfection” interpretation supported by Kant’s texts. The latter interpretation is, in my view, also present in a reading of our intellectual interest in natural beauty found in Kant’s Critique of Judgment. Finally, after I consider some objections, I assess Kant’s contribution to environmental ethics: (a) despite his anthropocentric approach, Kant does not domesticate non-human nature as biocentrism does, and (b) even if his approach can be characterised as speciesist, Kant does not see nature as a mere instrument – either as “natural capital” or “natural resource” – but as indispensable for our moral perfection.

Ključne riječi

Immanuel Kant; non-human nature; duties; moral perfection; natural beauty; domestication

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